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INTRODUCTION—NEW ASIAN FRAMEWORKS FOR THIRD 
PARTY FUNDING 
On January 10, 2017, the Civil Law (Amendment) Bill 
(38/2016) passed its second reading before the Parliament of 
Singapore. The Bill abolishes the torts of maintenance and champerty, 
and for the first time makes it expressly lawful for a third party to 
fund dispute resolution proceedings in Singapore. For now, the 
changes apply to international arbitration proceedings (and court 
proceedings in support of arbitration) only, but comments by Minister 
of Law, Indranee Rajah, make it clear that if the arbitration pilot is 
successful further expansion will follow. On March 1, 2017, the Bill 
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received the approval of the President and was published in the 
Government Gazette. 
In October 2016, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong 
(“HKLRC”) published its final report on third party funding for 
international arbitration, following a two-year consultation process. 
The Commission recommended that Hong Kong should legislate to 
permit the funding of international arbitration, subject to “clear ethical 
and financial safeguards.” Enabling legislation has been submitted to 
the Hong Kong Legislative Council for consideration during the 
current legislative session. 
A MODERN APPROACH 
These are significant developments. The common law was 
historically antipathetic towards any intrusion by financiers into the 
civil justice system—the doctrines of maintenance and champerty 
restricted the use of external finance to fund litigation for fear that this 
would “sully the purity of justice.” Over the years, the underlying 
public policy considerations have turned on their head. The fears in 
medieval England about weak courts needing protection from 
unscrupulous barons have been transformed into an altogether more 
modern concern, which is that the civil justice system has simply 
become too expensive for many. Third party funding has been found 
to enable access to civil justice, and funding prohibitions make little 
sense today. 
Policymakers in Singapore and Hong Kong are now looking to 
the future. Their review of third party funding comes as part of a drive 
to ensure their legal systems are internally effective as well as 
internationally competitive. In this regard, both jurisdictions are 
fortunate to have the experience of other jurisdictions to guide them. 
The litigation funding industry is around twenty years old in 
Australia, and around half that in England and Wales. These 
jurisdictions offer salient lessons for a maturing industry, as we seek 
to elucidate below. 
In this Article, we begin by examining how funding evolved first 
in Australia, and then in England and Wales. We focus on the impact 
of this development on litigation practice generally, and how the 
courts and regulatory authorities have responded. We then turn to the 
proposed legislation in Singapore and Hong Kong, and identify key 
issues that arise for arbitration funding in those countries. 
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Whilst certain issues are unique to arbitration—such as the need 
to prevent arbitrators’ conflicts—our central argument is that funding 
standards that have evolved in national litigation can be readily 
adapted and applied to the arbitral process without the need for 
wholesale changes. In short, the arbitral community should be able to 
avoid repeating hard-fought battles over long-decided issues in 
relevant, trusted jurisdictions. 
THE BIRTH OF COMMERCIAL LITIGATION FUNDING IN 
AUSTRALIA 
Litigation funding was pioneered in the last years of the 
twentieth century in Australia by the founders of IMF Bentham. It 
began as a solution for insolvency practitioners faced with insufficient 
funds in the creditors’ estate to pursue claims for recovery. During the 
2000s, funding spread to other practice areas such as commercial 
litigation and class actions. However, the growth of the industry in 
those early days was beset by obstacles, not least by a spate of 
satellite litigation brought by defendant lawyers seeking to knock out 
claims on the basis that their funding was an abuse of process and 
contrary to public policy. Even after the doctrines of maintenance and 
champerty were abolished as crimes and torts in a number of states by 
statute in 1993, funders still faced significant challenges. The first 
challenge was to prove to the satisfaction of the courts that the public 
policy of promoting access to justice required allowing private 
finance into the market for litigation services. The second challenge 
was to show funders had an important role to play in supporting the 
justice system, namely by promoting only meritorious claims, paying 
adverse costs orders when due, and assisting with the management of 
litigation so that cases ran quickly, efficiently, and economically. 
The turning point in Australia was the decision of the High 
Court of Australia (Australia’s most senior appellate court, equivalent 
to the Supreme Court in the United States) in Campbells Cash and 
Carry Pty Limited v. Fostif Pty Limited.1 Fostif involved a class 
action to recover amounts paid by retailers of tobacco products to 
wholesalers, representing license fees that the wholesalers did not 
pass onto the tax commissioner because the license fees were held to 
be unconstitutional. A third party agreed to fund representative 
proceedings against the wholesalers, taking de facto control over the 
                                                            
1. (2006) 229 CLR 386. 
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litigation for 33.3% of the proceeds. The joint majority judgment of 
Justices Gummow, Hayne, and Crennan confirmed that access to 
justice was indeed a consideration of public policy that should be 
given paramount importance, that little to no evidence existed of 
abuse of process by funders, and that the courts already possessed 
sufficient means in which to punish funders who went astray (such as 
third party costs orders and contempt of court orders): 
89. As Mason P rightly pointed out in the Court of Appeal, many 
people seek profit from assisting the processes of litigation. That 
a person who hazards funds in litigation wishes to control the 
litigation is hardly surprising. That someone seeks out those who 
may have a claim and excites litigation where otherwise there 
would be none could be condemned as contrary to public policy 
only if a general rule against the maintenance of actions were to 
be adopted. But that approach has long since been abandoned and 
the qualification of that rule (by reference to criteria of common 
interest) proved unsuccessful. And if the conduct is neither 
criminal nor tortious, what would be the ultimate foundation for a 
conclusion not only that maintaining an action (or maintaining an 
action in return for a share of the proceeds) should be considered 
as contrary to public policy, but also that the claim that is 
maintained should not be determined by the court whose 
jurisdiction otherwise is regularly invoked? 
90. Two kinds of consideration are proffered as founding a rule 
of public policy—fears about adverse effects on the processes of 
litigation and fears about the “fairness” of the bargain struck 
between funder and intended litigant. In Giles v Thompson, Lord 
Mustill said that the law of maintenance and champerty could 
best “be kept in forward motion” by looking to its origins; these 
his Lordship saw as reflecting “a principle of public policy 
designed to protect the purity of justice and the interests of 
vulnerable litigants.” 
91. Neither of these considerations, whatever may be their 
specific application in a particular case, warrants formulation of 
an overarching rule of public policy that either would, in effect, 
bar the prosecution of an action where any agreement has been 
made to provide money to a party to institute or prosecute the 
litigation in return for a share of the proceeds of the litigation, or 
would bar the prosecution of some actions according to whether 
the funding agreement met some standards fixing the nature or 
degree of control or reward the funder may have under the 
agreement. To meet these fears by adopting a rule in either form 
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would take too broad an axe to the problems that may be seen to 
lie behind the fears. 
92. It is necessary to bear steadily in mind that questions of 
illegality and public policy may arise when considering whether 
a funding agreement is enforceable. So much follows from s 6 of 
the Abolition Act. Further, to ask whether the bargain struck 
between a funder and intended litigant is “fair” assumes that 
there is some ascertainable objective standard against which 
fairness is to be measured and that the courts should exercise 
some (unidentified) power to relieve persons of full age and 
capacity from bargains otherwise untainted by infirmity. Neither 
assumption is well founded. 
93. As for fears that “the funder’s intervention will be inimical 
to the due administration of justice”, whether because “[t]he 
greater the share of the spoils . . . the greater the temptation to 
stray from the path of rectitude” or for some other reason, it is 
necessary first to identify what exactly is feared. In particular, 
what exactly is the corruption of the processes of the Court that is 
feared? It was said, in In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2), that “[t]he 
common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be 
tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to 
suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses.” Why is that fear 
not sufficiently addressed by existing doctrines of abuse of 
process and other procedural and substantive elements of the 
court’s processes? And if lawyers undertake obligations that may 
give rise to conflicting duties there is no reason proffered for 
concluding that present rules regulating lawyers’ duties to the 
court and to clients are insufficient to meet the difficulties that 
are suggested might arise.2 
In recent years Australia has adopted a “light touch” approach to 
the regulation of litigation funding, and funding has become a 
mainstream feature of the legal market. The activity of funding is not 
regulated—provided that funders maintain an adequate policy to 
manage conflicts of interest—in essence, clarifying that while funders 
may take day-to-day management of funded litigation, a lawyer’s 
fiduciary duties are only owed to the client who can override the 
funder’s instructions at any point. 
Further, large commercial funders who are listed and highly 
capitalized, such as IMF Bentham, will routinely disclose their 
involvement in a matter, and (since Australia is a jurisdiction with 
                                                            
2. Id. at 434-35.  
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cost shifting) will typically agree to pay adverse costs orders as well 
as funding the claimant’s costs and disbursements. As a consequence, 
tactical applications around the involvement of funders are rare, as are 
requests for security for costs on funded matters—which in turn 
allows the parties to focus on what is important: resolving the 
substance of their dispute. 
In short, over twenty years, an efficient and effective funding 
market has evolved which provides a valuable service to litigants and 
which requires minimum intervention by statutory regulators or by 
the courts. The emphasis is on commercial freedoms, so that parties 
are free to choose how to finance and manage their disputes, just as 
they are free to choose with whom to contract and where to resolve 
their differences. 
ENGLAND AND WALES: SELF-REGULATION 
The traditional position of the English courts was that any 
agreement which purported to share the spoils of litigation would be 
champertous (or “wanton and officious intermeddling in the disputes 
of others”) and void on the basis of public policy. As cited in Fostif 
above, Lord Denning described the kind of “intermeddling” that was 
feared as follows: “to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or 
even to suborn witnesses . . . .”3  
In 1967, the crimes of maintenance and champerty were 
abolished by statute. However, whilst certain types of funding were 
permitted (for example, by trade unions and—following the Access to 
Justice Act 1999—by solicitors under Conditional Fee Agreements), 
commercial funding of disputes did not begin to take off until the 
mid-2000s, following a series of decisions by the Court of Appeal 
then led by Lord Phillips MR.4 In Arkin v. Borchard Lines, the court 
devised a principle that funders’ liability for adverse costs should be 
limited to the amount of funding they were providing in the case—a 
principle known as the “Arkin Cap”: 
If a professional funder, who is contemplating funding a discrete 
part of an impecunious claimant’s expenses, such as the cost of 
expert evidence, is to be potentially liable for the entirety of the 
                                                            
3. In re Trepca Mines Ltd. (No. 2) [1963] 1 Ch. 199. 
4. Hamilton v. Al Fayed [2002] 2 W.L.R. 128; Regina (Factortame) Ltd. v. Secretary of State 
for Transport, Local Government and the Region (No. 8) [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1104; Arkin v. 
Borchard Lines [2005] EWCA Civ. 655. 
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defendant’s costs should the claim fail, no professional funder 
will be likely to be prepared to provide the necessary funding. 
The exposure will be too great to render funding on a 
contingency basis of recovery a viable commercial transaction. 
Access to justice will be denied. We consider, however, that 
there is a solution that is practicable, just and that caters for some 
of the policy considerations that we have considered above. 
40.  We consider that a professional funder, who finances part of 
a claimant’s costs of litigation, should be potentially liable for the 
costs of the opposing party to the extent of the funding provided . 
. . . Our approach is designed to cater for the commercial funder 
who is financing part of the costs of the litigation in a manner 
which facilitates access to justice and which is not otherwise 
objectionable. Such funding will leave the claimant as the party 
primarily interested in the result of the litigation and the party in 
control of the conduct of the litigation.5 
Following the decision in Arkin, which was decided around the 
same time as Fostif, a similarly light touch approach was taken to the 
regulation of funding in England and Wales as in Australia. 
Following the Reforms to Civil Litigation headed by Lord Justice 
Jackson in 2010, a voluntary Code of Conduct was created to regulate 
the use of funding. The Association of Litigation Funders (“ALF”) 
Code sets voluntary guidelines for funders to follow, in particular, 
around capital adequacy, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and the 
key terms to be included in litigation funding agreements. 
One key point of difference emerged: whereas in Australia it was 
accepted that clients could, if they wished, ask a funder to manage the 
litigation on their behalf, the ALF Code provided that funders “will 
not seek to influence the Litigant’s solicitor or barrister to cede 
control or conduct of the dispute to the funder.” However, recently it 
seems that the gap between English and Australian law on this issue 
may be narrowing. In Excalibur Ventures LLC v. Texas Keystone & 
Ors,6 the Court of Appeal granted indemnity costs against a series of 
funders who backed Excalibur’s failed claim to a share of some 
valuable oil fields in Kurdistan. The ALF intervened as an interested 
party, and submitted that funders under English law were in a difficult 
position because though they could provide funds to a claimant, they 
                                                            
5. Arkin, supra note 4, at [39] - [40]. 
6. [2016] EWCA Civ. 1144. 
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had little control over the conduct of the litigation in the claimant’s 
hands. Lord Justice Tomlinson stated as follows: 
31.  I should also comment on the suggestion of the ALF that “to 
avoid being fixed with the conduct of the funded party, the 
funder would have to exercise greater control over the conduct of 
the litigation throughout and that this runs the risk that the 
funding agreement would be champertous”. I understand why 
this concern is raised but I consider that it is unrealistic. As the 
judge pointed out, champerty involves behaviour likely to 
interfere with the due administration of justice. Litigation 
funding is an accepted and judicially sanctioned activity 
perceived to be in the public interest. What the judge 
characterised as “rigorous analysis of law, facts and witnesses, 
consideration of proportionality and review at appropriate 
intervals” is what is to be expected of a responsible funder – as 
the ALF to some extent acknowledges and as did some of the 
funders in this case in their evidence presented to the judge – and 
cannot of itself be champertous. I agree that, rather than 
interfering with the due administration of justice, if anything such 
activities promote the due administration of justice. For the 
avoidance of doubt I should mention that on-going review of the 
progress of litigation through the medium of lawyers independent 
of those conducting the litigation, a fortiori those conducting it 
on a conditional fee agreement, seems to me not just prudent but 
often essential in order to reduce the risk of orders for indemnity 
costs being made against the unsuccessful funded party. When 
conducted responsibly, as by the members of the ALF I am sure 
it would be, there is no danger of such review being characterised 
as champertous.7 
SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG APPROVE FUNDING FOR 
ARBITRATIONS 
In Hong Kong, it is still a criminal offense to maintain litigation: 
as recently as 2011, solicitors have been convicted for acting on 
contingency, for example in Winnie Lo v. HKSAR.8 However, since 
the mid-2000s, attitudes towards funding have started to soften. There 
have been several decisions, in particular by Justices Harris and 
Ribeiro, in which the courts have recognized the lawfulness of 
funding in certain defined categories, for example where the funds are 
                                                            
7. Id. at [31]. 
8. [2011] FACC 2/2011. 
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necessary to provide access to justice for impecunious claimants and 
insolvency practitioners.9 IMF Bentham has funded three cases 
brought by company liquidators in Hong Kong since 2013. 
In Singapore, meanwhile, the leading case is Re Vanguard 
Energy.10 The High Court held that an assignment of part of the 
proceeds of litigation to the shareholders of an insolvent company, 
who had agreed to fund the company to pursue its claims, was not 
champertous. However, funding of arbitration has remained restricted. 
In Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd. v. Clough Engineering Ltd. and Anor, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal held that there was no reason to treat 
arbitration differently to court litigation and if it was champertous to 
fund one, it would be champertous to fund the other.11 Interestingly, 
in Hong Kong, Justice Kaplan had reached the opposite conclusion in 
Cannonway Consultants, finding that the sophisticated parties who 
typically used arbitration had less need of protection by public 
policy.12 
These decisions have left the law in both jurisdictions in a 
confused and patchwork state—a clear deterrent for sophisticated 
users of arbitration, who have the choice of many high-class 
jurisdictions in which to resolve their disputes such as London, New 
York, Paris, or Geneva. In turn, this has prompted the legislative 
changes described above. We address below the key issues that the 
policymakers in Singapore and Hong Kong have had to consider. 
Statutory or Self-Regulation? 
Both Hong Kong and Singapore have, after extensive 
consultation, adopted to follow the “light touch” approach to 
regulation favored in Australia and England and Wales. For example, 
Singapore’s Ministry of Law (“MinLaw”) has described its aim as 
giving “precedence to party autonomy and flexibility, with disclosure 
as the central tenet,” taking into account the “‘light touch’ approach to 
                                                            
9. See e.g., Unruh v. Seeberger [2007] 10 HKCFAR 31; Re Cyberworks [2010] HKCU 974; 
Re Po Yuen Machine Factory [2012] HKCU 816. 
10. [2015] SGHC 156. 
11. [2007] 1 SLR 989. 
12. [1997] ADRLJ 95. 
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regulation that has generally been adopted in jurisdictions where third 
party funding is permitted.”13 
In our view, this is the correct approach, at least to begin with. It 
is axiomatic that in order to be successful, regulation must be 
principled and proportionate to the actual risks in question. Whereas 
insufficient regulation of a high-risk industry can lead to market 
misconduct, excessive regulation of a low-risk industry inhibits 
growth. Since funding is non-recourse, it is inherently self-regulating: 
funders will lose their investments if they finance unmeritorious 
claims. Further, in our experience, as detailed above, the evidence 
shows the risks relating to third party funding are minimal, and as the 
High Court of Australia found in Fostif, if risks do materialize, they 
can be addressed by existing court and tribunal powers. 
Abolition of Maintenance and Champerty as a Tort 
Both jurisdictions propose to carve out arbitral proceedings 
(including court proceedings in support of arbitration) from the torts 
(and in Hong Kong, the crimes) of maintenance and champerty. In 
Singapore, this has taken the form of an outright statutory abolition, 
similar to the Australian and English legislation cited above. These 
are welcome developments. As experiences elsewhere have shown, 
the reality is that medieval prohibitions against maintenance and 
champerty have become obsolete. 
However, it will still be possible for funding arrangements to be 
held unenforceable if they constitute an abuse of public policy. In 
Singapore, arbitration funding agreements will be presumed to be 
enforceable, provided that the requirements prescribed by the 
Regulations are met (essentially, that the funder meets a defined 
capital adequacy requirement). If not, the funder will cease to be 
“qualifying” and its rights “under or arising out of the third-party 
funding contract affected by or connected with the disqualification or 
non-compliance are not enforceable.”14 The implication is that this 
will include accrued rights, which critically for a funder will include 
the right to the return of its investment and fee upon the successful 
outcome of a case. 
                                                            
13.  Public Consultation on the Draft Civil Law (Amendment) Bill 2016 (“Amendment Bill”); 
Civil Law (Third Party Funding) Regulation 2016, Government of Singapore, 30 June 2016 at 
[12] (“Consultation Paper”). 
14.  Amendment Bill, supra note 13, at § 5B(4). 
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It remains to be seen whether this wording may lead to satellite 
disputes around whether or not a funder is “qualifying,” which could 
in turn act as a deterrent to investment. In the meantime, parties 
seeking funding would be well advised to do careful due diligence on 
their choice of funders and only choose funding partners with strong 
balance sheets. 
 
Disclosure Requirements 
MinLaw’s consultation paper states that,  
 . . . related amendments to the Legal Profession (Professional 
Conduct Rules) are envisaged [that] draw reference from best 
practices and international standards reflected in the revised 
International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest. 
In brief, (i) Legal practitioners will be under a duty to disclose 
the existence of a third party funding contract and the identity of 
the third party funder to the Court or tribunal and to every other 
party to the proceedings, as soon as is practicable.15 
The HKLRC reached a similar conclusion, but the disclosure 
obligation will lie with funded parties and not their lawyers:  
[i]f a Funding Agreement is made, the Funded Party must give 
written notice of the fact and the identity of the Third Party 
Funder on the commencement of the arbitration . . . or within 15 
days after the Funding Agreement is made.16 
Due to the particular nature of international arbitration proceedings 
(such as arbitrators’ conflicts), these disclosure requirements reflect a 
sensible position. However, this is subject to an important 
qualification. The disclosure to the Tribunal and opposing party 
should be of two discrete points only: first, the existence of funding 
(including the name and address of the funder), and second, whether 
the funding agreement contains an agreement to pay any adverse 
costs. 
Opposing parties should not, as a matter of course, have access 
to the confidential financing arrangements of their opponents, which 
are irrelevant to the substance of a dispute. If, contrary to that 
submission, a Tribunal is minded to grant such disclosure, the 
                                                            
15.  Consultation Paper, supra note 13, at [11]. 
16.  THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, REPORT—THIRD PARTY FUNDING FOR 
ARBITRATION 18 (October 2016). 
1044 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:3 
relevant procedural award should provide for redaction of all 
commercially sensitive and case sensitive details (such as the 
litigation budget, the terms of funding, or the funder’s risk 
assessment) which might confer a tactical advantage on an opposing 
party. 
Control by the Funder 
There are two important issues which have been thus far left 
open by both legislatures. The first is the degree of “control” to be 
permitted to a third-party funder. Arbitration is a process founded on 
the consent of parties, as expressed in their contractual terms. 
Consistent with the principle of freedom of contract is the principle 
that parties should be free to choose where and how their disputes are 
resolved, and similarly free to determine how their disputes be 
managed on their behalf. The fact is that litigation, for many, is a very 
unwelcome drain on time and resources particularly for those that are 
inexperienced in the process. For such clients, litigation management 
services from a professional provider like IMF Bentham removes a 
significant burden and distraction from their shoulders. 
Accordingly, in our view claimants should have the right to 
freely choose the level of involvement in the dispute they cede to a 
funder, provided there is no prejudice to the court or Tribunal’s 
process. Any proposed fetter to this right is contrary to the parties’ 
freedom of contract and contrary to the consensual nature of 
arbitration. Further, this approach appears to sit oddly with the fact 
that, in modern societies such as Singapore and Hong Kong, 
competent adults may give control over their affairs to others through 
a power of attorney, and yet could not give control over their 
litigation to a professional, fulltime, expert litigation manager such as 
a funder if they wished to do so. 
The experience in Australia, post-Fostif shows clearly that initial 
concerns that funders would subvert the civil justice system if they 
were allowed to manage proceedings were unfounded. In fact, given 
the provisions in IMF Bentham’s Australian funding agreements—
such as the provisions that enable funded parties to override any 
instructions given by IMF Bentham to the lawyers, and the provisions 
that deal with how to resolve disputes in relation to settlement—there 
is no such thing as “total control” or “absolute control.” 
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It is important that the lawyer’s ethical and fiduciary duties owed 
to the funded party must not be restricted or impeded by the funder 
and, in the event of a conflict arising between the funder and the 
funded party, the lawyer must be free to act in the best interests of the 
funded party, even if this is detrimental to the funder. These 
protections can be expressly included in litigation funding agreements 
and policies on conflicts of interest. 
Adverse Costs 
The second unresolved issue is whether arbitral tribunals should 
be granted jurisdiction to award adverse costs against funders who are 
not party to the arbitration agreement. This is an issue unique to 
arbitration, since as explained above Australian and English courts 
already possess the powers to make costs orders against funders. In 
our view, it is appropriate for arbitral tribunals to have the power to 
award costs against a funder, provided: 
 the funding agreement for that arbitration contains an 
obligation to pay any adverse costs award (noting that 
not all funded clients will choose to contract for such 
an obligation; for example, the client may wish to bear 
the risk itself, or obtain an ATE insurance policy from 
another provider); and 
 the adverse costs order arises in relation to costs 
incurred in a period in which the arbitration was funded 
by the third-party funder in question (noting that not all 
proceedings are funded from the outset; it is inequitable 
for costs to be ordered in respect of matters arising 
prior or after the period of funding). 
This position is consistent with International Bar Association (“IBA”) 
Guideline 6(b), which requires the presence of a 
direct economic interest in . . . the arbitration: If one of the 
parties is a legal entity, any legal or physical person having a 
controlling influence on the legal entity, or a direct economic 
interest in, or a duty to indemnify a party for, the award to be 
rendered in the arbitration, may be considered to bear the identity 
of such party.17 
                                                            
17.  IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, General Standard 
6(b). 
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Since the IBA has deemed that funders may be identified with the 
funded claimant, it is arguable that they may be deemed to have 
agreed to arbitration also. However, many, if not most, arbitration 
decisions we are aware of have found that the funder did not agree to 
be bound to the arbitration agreement. The funder therefore cannot 
necessarily be required to pay any adverse costs award. There is 
considerable potential for uncertainty in this regard, and for 
unnecessary applications seeking security for costs. 
We suggest a simple solution to this issue. In most funded 
litigation in Australia, IMF Bentham agrees to pay any adverse costs 
ordered in the event that the funded claim fails, and lodges a simple 
Deed Poll with the court to this effect. In most cases, this avoids the 
need for applications for security for costs, saving the parties time and 
money and allowing them to focus on the substance of their dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
The new legislation in Singapore and proposed legislation in 
Hong Kong represent a watershed moment in the evolution of third-
party funding for commercial disputes. They are the first legislatures 
to try and codify statutory rules in this area. Whilst some points of 
detail remain to be resolved, the proposed rules draw heavily and 
sensibly on the experience of funded court litigation in other common 
law jurisdictions. Those practices and standards are now being 
molded to fit the arbitral process, without the need for wholesale 
changes. This demonstrates the flexibility of both the funding 
business model and of arbitration as a powerful mode of dispute 
resolution. 
We expect these innovations to bring increasing commercial and 
investment arbitration to Singapore and Hong Kong over time. And 
these sensible approaches will more generally promote the use of 
arbitration in dispute resolution in and around Asia. Should the results 
be successful—as in Australia, England, and Wales—other 
jurisdictions, arbitral institutions, and industry sectors can be expected 
to follow. 
 
